Determining the Optimal Contract Farming Model from the Perspective of Rapeseed Farmers in Mazandaran Province

Abstract

In recent years, contract farming has gained attention as an effective approach for enhancing production efficiency, securing market access, and reducing economic risks in the agricultural sector. By identifying a contract model that aligns with farmers’ preferences, it becomes possible to design agreements that foster more sustainable supply chain relationships between farmers and buyers. This study aims to determine the optimal contract farming model from the perspective of rapeseed farmers in Mazandaran Province, Iran. In the first phase, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was employed to prioritize key components influencing contract design. Data were collected through questionnaires completed by 16 experts familiar with contract farming. The AHP results indicated that components such as input provision, pricing mechanism, the existence of options contracts, contract duration, contract incentives, provision of technical and advisory services, and pricing methods are of high importance in contract farming. In the second phase, based on varying levels of the most significant identified features, 16 types of contracts were designed and presented to farmers for selecting the most preferred model. The study's statistical population comprised rapeseed farmers in Mazandaran Province, from which 361 were selected through multi-stage cluster sampling. Data were collected via field surveys and questionnaires. The findings revealed that farmers prefer contracts that include input provision, incentive mechanisms, technical and advisory support, variable pricing based on daily market rates, a one-year duration, and purchase prices higher than the guaranteed minimum price per kilogram of rapeseed offered by buyers. These results suggest that rapeseed farmers in Mazandaran seek contracts that minimize risk, maximize profit, offer technical support, and provide contractual flexibility.